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Abstract
Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to
assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-oﬀs
between the well-being of diﬀerent generations implicit in each such rule reﬂect the under-
lying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice.
We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive social-
evaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare infor-
mation and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We
focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare infor-
mation. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this
information is available for each alternative to be ranked.
Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates
or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard
properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an
intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we
characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting
rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism.
Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting
in the context of our model. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: D63.
Keywords: Intergenerational Equity and Justice, Intertemporal Social Choice, Welfarist
and Non-Welfarist Social Evaluation.
1. Introduction
A social-evaluation functional assigns a social ranking of alternatives to each information
proﬁle in its domain. In the classical multi-proﬁle model of social choice, proﬁles are
restricted to welfare information: all non-welfare information is implicitly assumed to be
ﬁxed. Because of this, the conventional approach does not allow us to discern the way in
which the functional makes use of non-welfare information. For that, multiple non-welfare
proﬁles are needed. Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a] analyze a framework in
which non-welfare information may vary across information proﬁles. Each information
proﬁle includes a vector of individual utility functions which represent welfare information
and a vector of functions which describe social and individual non-welfare information. See
also Kelsey [1987] and Roberts [1980] for approaches to social choice where non-welfare
information is explicitly modeled.
A social-evaluation functional is welfarist if a single ordering of utility vectors, to-
gether with the utility information in a proﬁle, is suﬃcient to rank all alternatives. The
ordering of utility vectors is called a social-evaluation ordering. Welfarism is a consequence
of three axioms: unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and binary independence of irrele-
vant alternatives. Unlimited domain requires that all logically possible proﬁles are in the
domain of the functional. If everyone’s well-being is the same in two alternatives for a
given proﬁle, then Pareto indiﬀerence requires the social ranking generated by that proﬁle
to declare the two alternatives equally good. This axiom is implied by a plausible property
introduced by Goodin [1991]. If one alternative is declared socially better than another,
he suggests it should be better for at least one member of society. Binary independence
is a consistency condition across proﬁles. If welfare and non-welfare information for two
alternatives coincide in two proﬁles, it requires the ranking of the alternatives to be the
same for both proﬁles. If anonymity, which requires individuals to be treated impartially,
is added to the three welfarism axioms, anonymous welfarism results. In that case, the
social-evaluation ordering is anonymous: any permutation of a utility vector is as good as
the utility vector itself.
In this paper, we employ an intertemporal structure for social evaluation. This results
in a special case of the above-described model. The non-welfare information that is per-
mitted to vary consists of individual birth dates and lengths of life in each alternative, and
all other non-welfare information is assumed to be ﬁxed. To investigate social-evaluation
orderings in an intertemporal setting, we employ a period analysis with arbitrary period
length. There are multiple information proﬁles which provide, for each person, lifetime
utility, birth date and length of life in each alternative. We assume that no person can live
more than a ﬁxed number of periods. The maximal lifetime is ﬁnite but can be arbitrarily
large.
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We employ the standard axioms unlimited domain, binary independence of irrele-
vant alternatives and anonymity. Unlimited domain allows birth dates and lifetimes to be
diﬀerent in diﬀerent alternatives. When this axiom is combined with the usual Pareto-
indiﬀerence condition and binary independence, welfarism results and, as a consequence,
dates of birth and lengths of life cannot aﬀect the social ordering. To investigate the in-
ﬂuences birth dates or lifetimes may have on social evaluation, therefore, it is necessary
to consider weaker axioms. If, in any two alternatives, the same individuals are alive and
have the same utility levels, birth dates and lengths of life, conditional Pareto indiﬀer-
ence requires them to be ranked as equally good. If a social-evaluation functional satisﬁes
unlimited domain, conditional Pareto indiﬀerence, binary independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives and anonymity, there exists an anonymous ordering of compound vectors of
individual utilities, birth dates and lifetimes which, together with the information in a
proﬁle, can be used to rank the alternatives. Because non-welfare information (in partic-
ular, birth dates and lifetimes) can inﬂuence the social ordering, not all of these orderings
are welfarist.
The model of this paper is a ﬁxed-population version of the variable-population frame-
work analyzed in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995, 1997, 1999, 2005b]. However,
unlike these earlier papers, we focus on the intertemporal aspect rather than the popula-
tion aspect of the issue. As a consequence, we can dispense with some assumptions that
are required in the variable-population case. This move necessitates some new arguments
in our analysis because some of the techniques applied in our earlier work rely on the
possibility of varying the population. Moreover, we provide a general result allowing for
both birth dates and lifetimes to matter in addition to lifetime well-being.
In our intertemporal setting, a natural independence condition can be imposed. The
axiom is called independence of the utilities of the dead and it requires the ranking of
any two alternatives to be independent of the utilities of individuals whose lives are over
and who had the same lifetime utilities, birth dates and lifetimes in both alternatives.
When combined with intertemporal versions of axioms such as continuity, anonymity and
the above-mentioned variants of the Pareto conditions, independence of the utilities of
the dead has remarkably strong consequences. The axioms imply independence of the
utilities of all who are unconcerned, not only of those whose lives are over. In addition,
depending on the version of the Pareto axiom employed, several classes of intertemporal
generalized-utilitarian orderings are characterized. Intertemporal generalized utilitarian-
ism ranks any two alternatives by comparing their total transformed utilities. Birth-date
dependent generalized utilitarianism allows the transformation to depend on birth dates,
and lifetime dependent generalized utilitarianism allows it to depend on lengths of life.
Finally, birth-date and lifetime dependent generalized-utilitarian orderings are such that
the transformation may depend on both birth dates and lifetimes.
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In order to assess whether social-evaluation orderings should be sensitive to birth dates
or lengths of life, consider a birth-date and lifetime dependent generalized-utilitarian or-
dering such that the transformation is sensitive to birth dates. In that case, there exist
a lifetime-utility level, a lifetime and two diﬀerent birth dates such that the transformed
value of the utility level is diﬀerent, given the lifetime at the two values for birth date.
Now consider an alternative in which a person has the utility level and lifetime just men-
tioned. We wish to compare two alternatives that diﬀer only in the birth date of the
person. Because the conditional transformation is sensitive to birth date at that utility
level and lifetime, one birth date will be ranked as better than the other. The transforma-
tion is continuous in utility and, therefore, betterness is preserved for some small decrease
in utility. Thus, such a ordering approves of changes in birth dates even when, in terms of
well-being, no one gains and someone loses. A similar argument applies to sensitivity to
lifetimes. This suggests that we should reject the conditional Pareto axioms and, instead,
opt in favor of intertemporal strong Pareto, ruling out the eﬀects of non-welfare informa-
tion. If this is done, intertemporal generalized utilitarianism results: the transformation
cannot depend on birth dates or lifetimes.
Special forms of birth-date dependent orderings are employed frequently in economic
models. In particular, orderings that are based on geometric discounting are widely used
and, for that reason, we investigate them in some detail although we do not endorse them.
Using a positive discount factor, the geometric birth-date dependent generalized-utilitarian
orderings employ the sum of the discounted transformed utilities. Geometric birth-date
dependent generalized utilitarianism is characterized by adding stationarity to the axioms
characterizing birth-date dependent generalized utilitarianism. Suppose that the birth
date of everyone in each of two alternatives is moved forward in time by a given number
of periods. Stationarity requires the ranking of the resulting alternatives to be the same
as that of the originals.
The concluding section of the paper addresses two issues. The ﬁrst is a discussion of
our choice of domain, in particular, the possibility of assigning diﬀerent birth dates to the
same person in diﬀerent alternatives. The second re-examines the practice of discounting
and we provide arguments against the discounting of well-being and suggest that concerns
for unacceptable suﬀering of the present generation are better addressed by imposing
constraints that prevent this from happening rather than changing the social objective
into an ethically undesirable one.
2. Welfare information and non-welfare information
We use Z+ to denote the set of non-negative integers and Z++ is the set of positive
integers. The set of real numbers is denoted by R and R++ is the set of all positive reals.
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For n ∈ Z++, 1n is the vector consisting of n ones. Our notation for vector inequalities is
, >, ≥. For a non-empty set Y and n ∈ Z++, Y n is the n-fold Cartesian product of Y .
Suppose there is a universal set of alternatives X with at least three elements. In order
to focus on the intertemporal aspect of our investigation, we assume that the population—
the set of those who ever live—is ﬁxed and ﬁnite but note that, with a few additional as-
sumptions, our model and the results can be reformulated in a variable-population setting;
see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005b] for a discussion. The population is denoted
by {1, . . . , n} where n ≥ 3. Note that the population is assumed to be ﬁnite whereas the
universal set of alternatives can be (countably or uncountably) inﬁnite or ﬁnite. At least
three elements are required in X to obtain a generalization of the welfarism theorem, and
the minimal number of individuals is three in order to apply a well-known separability
property.
Each individual i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has a lifetime-utility function Ui:X → R where, for
all x ∈ X, Ui(x) is the lifetime utility of i in alternative x. A utility (or welfare) proﬁle is
an n-tuple U = (U1, . . . , Un) and the set of all logically possible utility proﬁles is U . For
x ∈ X, we write U(x) for the vector (U1(x), . . . , Un(x)).
Time periods are indexed by non-negative integers and individuals may be born in
any period after period zero. There is a ﬁnite maximal lifetime L¯ ∈ Z++ but this upper
bound on the number of periods in which an individual may be alive can be arbitrarily
large.
Because our objective is to examine the intertemporal aspects of social evaluation,
we focus on birth dates and lengths of life as the non-welfare information that may be of
relevance. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Si:X → Z+ assigns the period just before i is born to
each alternative. Analogously, Li:X → {1, . . . , L¯} is a function that speciﬁes i’s lifetime for
each alternative. Thus, in alternative x ∈ X, i is alive in periods Si(x)+1, . . . , Si(x)+Li(x).
A period-before-birth-date proﬁle is an n-tuple S = (S1, . . . , Sn) and the set of all logically
possible period-before-birth-date proﬁles is S. Analogously, a lifetime proﬁle is an n-tuple
L = (L1, . . . , Ln) and the set of all logically possible lifetime proﬁles is L. Furthermore,
we deﬁne S(x) = (S1(x), . . . , Sn(x)) and L(x) = (L1(x), . . . , Ln(x)) for all x ∈ X.
We allow birth dates to vary across alternatives, although it is often argued that birth
dates are ﬁxed. Without going into too much detail at this stage, we note that there is
some variation because the duration of pregnancy is not ﬁxed. A discussion of possible
criticisms to our model and our responses are provided in the concluding section.
An information proﬁle (a proﬁle, for short) collects welfare information and non-
welfare information in a vector Υ = (U, S, L) ∈ U × S × L. For x ∈ X, we write Υ(x) =
(U(x), S(x), L(x)). We deﬁne Ω = R×Z+×{1, . . . , L¯}. Thus, the set of possible compound
vectors (u, s, ) of utility vectors, vectors of periods before birth and vectors of lifetimes is
Ωn = Rn × Zn+ × {1, . . . , L¯}n.
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A social-evaluation functional assigns a social ordering of the alternatives in X to
each information proﬁle in its domain. Our model is a special case of that studied in
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a] where non-welfare information is not restricted
to birth dates and lengths of life.
Letting O denote the set of all orderings on X, a social-evaluation functional is a
mapping F :D → O where ∅ = D ⊆ U × S × L is the domain of F . We write RΥ = F (Υ)
for all Υ ∈ D. The asymmetric and symmetric factors of RΥ are PΥ and IΥ. Many of
the orderings characterized in this paper are not welfarist—they depend on birth dates or
lifetimes in addition to lifetime utilities. Nevertheless, the informational basis required for
social evaluation can be simpliﬁed in the presence of some mild axioms. We introduce the
axioms and state the relevant result but we do not provide a proof because it is analogous
to that of the corresponding theorem in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a].
Our ﬁrst axiom is unlimited domain. It requires the social-evaluation functional to
produce a social ordering for all logically possible information proﬁles.
Unlimited domain: D = U × S × L.
The next axiom is a conditional version of the well-known Pareto-indiﬀerence condi-
tion familiar from traditional social-choice theory. Our version is weaker because it requires
the conclusion of the axiom only if not only welfare information but also non-welfare in-
formation is the same in two alternatives.
Conditional Pareto indiﬀerence: For all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ ∈ D, if Υ(x) = Υ(y),
then xIΥy.
Binary independence of irrelevant alternatives is deﬁned as usual. If two proﬁles and
two alternatives are such that the proﬁles agree on the alternatives, then the ranking of
the alternatives must be the same in both proﬁles.
Binary independence of irrelevant alternatives: For all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ, Υ¯ ∈
D, if Υ(x) = Υ¯(x) and Υ(y) = Υ¯(y), then
xRΥy ⇔ xRΥ¯y.
Anonymity requires the social-evaluation functional to be independent of the labels
of the individuals—everyone in society is treated equally.
Anonymity: For all Υ, Υ¯ ∈ D, if there exists a bijection ρ: {1, . . . , n} → {1 . . . , n} such
that Υi = Υ¯ρ(i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then RΥ = RΥ¯.
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Anonymity is easily defended because it allows non-welfare information to matter. All
that is ruled out is the claim that an individual’s identity justiﬁes special treatment, no
matter what non-welfare information obtains.
An ordering R on Ωn is anonymous if and only if, for all (u, s, ) ∈ Ωn and for all
bijections ρ: {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n},(
(uρn(1), . . . , uρn(n)), (sρn(1), . . . , sρn(n)), (ρn(1), . . . , ρn(n))
)
I(u, s, ).
The four axioms imply that any two alternatives can be ranked by examining the
lifetime utilities, the birth dates and the lifetimes obtained in the two alternatives only—
no further information is required. Moreover, anonymity implies that the ranking of the
compound vectors of lifetime utilities, birth dates and lengths of life is anonymous—it
is insensitive with respect to the labels we give to the individuals. Because the proof is
analogous to that of the version of the welfarism theorem stated in Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2005a], we omit it.
Theorem 1: Suppose F satisﬁes unlimited domain. F satisﬁes conditional Pareto indif-
ference, binary independence of irrelevant alternatives and anonymity if and only if there
exists an anonymous social-evaluation ordering R on Ωn such that, for all x, y ∈ X and
for all Υ ∈ D,
xRΥy ⇔
(
U(x), S(x), L(x)
)
R
(
U(y), S(y), L(y)
)
.
The asymmetric and symmetric factors of the social-evaluation ordering R are denoted by
P and I.
3. A preliminary result
The proof of our main result makes use of a well-known theorem in atemporal social choice.
This theorem characterizes the class of generalized-utilitarian orderings by means of some
plausible axioms.
Let
∗
R be an ordering on Rn with asymmetric factor ∗P and symmetric factor ∗I . The
interpretation of
∗
R is that of an atemporal social-evaluation ordering—it is a special case of
R that depends on utility vectors only.
∗
R is anonymous if and only if, for all u ∈ Rn and for
all bijections ρ: {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}, (uρ(1), . . . , uρ(n))
∗
Iu.
∗
R is a generalized-utilitarian
ordering if and only if there exists a continuous and increasing function g:R → R such
that, for all u, v ∈ Rn,
u
∗
Rv ⇔
n∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
g(vi).
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Our ﬁrst axiom is continuity. As usual, it requires that small changes in utilities do
not lead to large changes in the social ranking.
Continuity: For all u ∈ Rn, the sets {v ∈ Rn | v ∗Ru} and {v ∈ Rn | u ∗Rv} are closed in
Rn.
Strong Pareto requires unanimity to be respected. If everyone’s well-being in a utility
vector u is greater than or equal to that person’s well-being in v with at least one strict
inequality, u is better than v according to
∗
R.
Strong Pareto: For all u, v ∈ Rn, if u > v, then u ∗Pv.
The ﬁnal axiom of this section is a separability property. It requires
∗
R to be indepen-
dent of the utilities of those who are unconcerned. Suppose that a proposed social change
aﬀects only the utilities of the members of a population subgroup. Independence of the
utilities of the unconcerned requires the social assessment of the change to be independent
of the utility levels of people who are not in the subgroup.
Independence of the utilities of the unconcerned: For all m ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, for
all u, v ∈ Rm and for all u¯, v¯ ∈ Rn−m,
(u, u¯)
∗
R(v, u¯)⇔ (u, v¯) ∗R(v, v¯).
In this deﬁnition, the individuals with utility vectors u¯ or v¯ are the unconcerned—they are
equally well oﬀ in (u, u¯) and (v, u¯) and in (u, v¯) and (v, v¯). The axiom requires the ranking
of pairs such as (u, u¯) and (v, u¯) to depend on the utilities of the concerned individuals
only. If formulated in terms of a real-valued representation, this axiom is referred to as
complete strict separability in Blackorby, Primont and Russell [1978]. A corresponding
separability axiom for social-evaluation functionals that depend on welfare information
only can be found in d’Aspremont and Gevers [1977] where it is called separability with
respect to unconcerned individuals. d’Aspremont and Gevers’ separability axiom is called
elimination of (the inﬂuence of) indiﬀerent individuals in Maskin [1978] and Roberts [1980].
In the case of two individuals, the axiom is redundant because it is implied by strong
Pareto but, if there are at least three individuals (an assumption we maintain throughout),
it has remarkably strong consequences. When combined with continuity and strong Pareto,
it characterizes generalized utilitarianism if
∗
R is assumed to be anonymous. The proof of
the following theorem, which employs Debreu’s [1959, pp. 56–59] representation theorem
and Gorman’s [1968] theorem on overlapping separable sets of variables (see also Acze´l
[1966, p. 312] and Blackorby, Primont, and Russell, [1978, p. 127]), is in Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [2002], for instance. Variants of the theorem can be found in Debreu [1960]
and Fleming [1952].
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Theorem 2: An anonymous ordering
∗
R satisﬁes continuity, strong Pareto and inde-
pendence of the utilities of the unconcerned if and only if
∗
R is a generalized-utilitarian
ordering.
4. Intertemporal axioms and orderings
The remaining axioms employed in this paper are formulated for the ordering R. Given the
axioms of Theorem 1, this involves no loss of generality. We introduce an intertemporal
version of continuity, conditional formulations of the strong-Pareto principle and three
variants of an axiom which ensures that the birth date of an individual can be changed
to a speciﬁc birth date (common for all individuals) without changing the social ranking,
provided the individual’s lifetime utility is suitably adjusted. These conditions ensure that
non-trivial trade-oﬀs are possible.
Continuity can be formulated in an intertemporal model in a way that is analogous to
its atemporal version. We require the social ranking to be continuous in lifetime utilities
for any ﬁxed pair of birth-date vectors and lifetime vectors.
Intertemporal continuity: For all (u, s, ) ∈ Ωn, the sets {v ∈ Rn | (v, s, )R(u, s, )}
and {v ∈ Rn | (u, s, )R(v, s, )} are closed in Rn.
The intertemporal version of the strong-Pareto principle has two parts. First, if each
individual has the same lifetime utilities in two alternatives, they are ranked as equally
good by the social ordering. Second, if everyone’s utility is greater than or equal in one
alternative than in another with at least one strict inequality, the former is better than
the latter.
Intertemporal strong Pareto: For all (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn,
(i) if u = v, then (u, s, )I(v, r, k);
(ii) if u > v, then (u, s, )P (v, r, k).
Intertemporal strong Pareto rules out the inﬂuence of non-utility information. To allow
such information to matter, we introduce the following conditional versions of the axiom.
The ﬁrst of these applies the principle conditionally on birth dates and lifetimes, the second
on birth dates only and the ﬁnal one on lifetimes only.
Conditional strong Pareto: For all (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn,
(i) if s = r,  = k and u = v, then (u, s, )I(v, r, k);
(ii) if s = r,  = k and u > v, then (u, s, )P (v, r, k).
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Birth-date conditional strong Pareto: For all (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn,
(i) if s = r and u = v, then (u, s, )I(v, r, k);
(ii) if s = r and u > v, then (u, s, )P (v, r, k).
Lifetime conditional strong Pareto: For all (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn,
(i) if  = k and u = v, then (u, s, )I(v, r, k);
(ii) if  = k and u > v, then (u, s, )P (v, r, k).
Part (i) of conditional strong Pareto is redundant because R is reﬂexive. It is included in
order to have the same structure as in the other strong-Pareto axioms.
The axiom individual intertemporal equivalence and its conditional counterparts en-
sure that, by suitably changing an individual’s lifetime utility, the birth date of the person
can be moved to a prespeciﬁed period without changing the social ranking. These condi-
tions guarantee the possibility of non-degenerate trade-oﬀs between birth dates or lifetimes
and utilities. We require more notation to proceed. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (u, s, ) ∈ Ωn and
(u′i, s
′
i, 
′
i) ∈ Ω. The vectors v = (u−i, u′i) ∈ Rn, r = (s−i, s′i) ∈ Zn+ and k = (−i, ′i) ∈
{1, . . . , L¯}n are deﬁned by
vj =
{
uj if j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i};
u′j if j = i,
rj =
{
sj if j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i};
s′j if j = i
and
kj =
{
j if j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i};
′j if j = i.
Individual intertemporal equivalence: There exists λ0 ∈ {1, . . . , L¯} such that, for all
(d, σ, λ) ∈ Ω and for all σ0 ∈ Z+, there exists dˆ ∈ R such that, for all (u, s, ) ∈ Ωn and
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},(
(u−i, dˆ), (s−i, σ0), (−i, λ0)
)
I
(
(u−i, d), (s−i, σ), (−i, λ)
)
.
Birth-date conditional individual intertemporal equivalence: There exists λ0 ∈
{1, . . . , L¯} such that, for all (d, σ) ∈ R×Z+ and for all σ0 ∈ Z+, there exists dˆ ∈ R such
that, for all (u, s) ∈ Rn ×Zn+ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},(
(u−i, dˆ), (s−i, σ0), λ01n
)
I
(
(u−i, d), (s−i, σ), λ01n
)
.
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Lifetime conditional individual intertemporal equivalence: There exist σ0 ∈ Z+
and λ0 ∈ {1, . . . , L¯} such that, for all (d, λ) ∈ R × {1, . . . , L¯}, there exists dˆ ∈ R such
that, for all (u, ) ∈ Rn × {1, . . . , L¯}n and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},(
(u−i, dˆ), σ01n, (−i, λ0)
)
I
(
(u−i, d), σ01n, (−i, λ)
)
.
The main result of this paper provides characterizations of generalized utilitarianism
and related orderings in our intertemporal setting. In each of the deﬁnitions of the ﬁrst
three classes of orderings, a condition regarding the possibility of equalizing the values of
the requisite transformation for diﬀerent birth dates or lifetimes is imposed. This condi-
tion is required in order to ensure that the relevant individual intertemporal equivalence
property is satisﬁed.
R is a birth-date and lifetime dependent generalized-utilitarian ordering if and only
if there exist a function h: Ω → R, continuous and increasing in its ﬁrst argument, and
λ0 ∈ {1, . . . , L¯} such that h(R, σ0, λ0) ∩ h(R, σ, λ) = ∅ for all σ0, σ ∈ Z+ and for all
λ ∈ {1, . . . , L¯} and, for all (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn,
(u, s, )R(v, r, k)⇔
n∑
i=1
h(ui, si, i) ≥
n∑
i=1
h(vi, ri, ki).
Analogously, R is a birth-date dependent generalized-utilitarian ordering if and only if
there exists a function f :R × Z+ → R, continuous and increasing in its ﬁrst argument,
such that f(R, σ0) ∩ f(R, σ) = ∅ for all σ0, σ ∈ Z+ and, for all (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn,
(u, s, )R(v, r, k)⇔
n∑
i=1
f(ui, si) ≥
n∑
i=1
f(vi, ri). (1)
R is a lifetime dependent generalized-utilitarian ordering if and only if there exist a function
e:R×{1, . . . , L¯} → R, continuous and increasing in its ﬁrst argument, and λ0 ∈ {1, . . . , L¯}
such that e(R, λ0) ∩ e(R, λ) = ∅ for all λ ∈ {1, . . . , L¯} and, for all (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn,
(u, s, )R(v, r, k)⇔
n∑
i=1
e(ui, i) ≥
n∑
i=1
e(vi, ki).
Finally, R is an intertemporal generalized-utilitarian ordering if and only if there exists a
continuous and increasing function g:R→ R such that, for all (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn,
(u, s, )R(v, r, k)⇔
n∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
g(vi).
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5. Intertemporal independence
When choices are made in a period t ∈ Z++, all feasible alternatives have a common
history but the lifetime utilities, birth dates and lifetimes of some members of society may
not be ﬁxed. If person i is alive in period t− 1, there may be alternatives in which i’s life
extends to period t and possibly beyond, whereas in other alternatives, i dies at the end
of period t− 1. This suggests that history must matter to some extent if lifetime utilities
are to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, some independence property is
desirable because decisions should not depend on the utilities of individuals who are long
dead, for example. If, in any period, an individual’s life is over in two alternatives and he or
she had the same lifetime utility, birth date and lifetime in both, a plausible requirement
is that the ranking of the two alternatives does not depend on the utility level of that
individual. In our setting, this leads to an independence condition whose scope is limited:
it applies only if the sets of those whose lives are over are identical in two alternatives and,
moreover, everyone in this set had the same lifetime utility, the same birth date and the
same lifetime in both.
Independence of the utilities of the dead: For all m ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, for all
(u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωm, for all (u¯, s¯, ¯), (v¯, r¯, k¯) ∈ Ωn−m and for all t ∈ Z++, if s¯i + ¯i < t
and r¯i+ k¯i < t for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n−m} and si+1 ≥ t and ri+1 ≥ t for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m},
then(
(u, u¯), (s, s¯), (, ¯)
)
R
(
(v, u¯), (r, s¯), (k, ¯)
)⇔ ((u, v¯), (s, r¯), (, k¯))R ((v, v¯), (r, r¯), (k, k¯)) .
Independence of the utilities of the dead is a weak separability condition because it applies
to individuals whose lives are over before period t only and not to all unconcerned individ-
uals. Thus, if all generations overlap, it does not impose any restrictions. However, when
combined with intertemporal strong Pareto or one of the conditional versions thereof, the
axiom becomes more powerful. We now provide characterizations of our intertemporal
variants of generalized utilitarianism by combining independence of the utilities of the
dead with the various intertemporal versions of strong Pareto and of the intertemporal-
equivalence axioms.
Theorem 3:
(i) An anonymous ordering R satisﬁes intertemporal continuity, conditional strong Pareto,
individual intertemporal equivalence and independence of the utilities of the dead if
and only if R is birth-date and lifetime dependent generalized-utilitarian.
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(ii) An anonymous ordering R satisﬁes intertemporal continuity, birth-date conditional
strong Pareto, birth-date conditional individual intertemporal equivalence and inde-
pendence of the utilities of the dead if and only if R is birth-date dependent generalized-
utilitarian.
(iii) An anonymous ordering R satisﬁes intertemporal continuity, lifetime conditional strong
Pareto, lifetime conditional individual intertemporal equivalence and independence of
the utilities of the dead if and only if R is lifetime dependent generalized-utilitarian.
(iv) An anonymous ordering R satisﬁes intertemporal continuity, intertemporal strong
Pareto and independence of the utilities of the dead if and only if R is intertemporal
generalized-utilitarian.
Proof. We provide a detailed proof of Part (i). That the birth-date and lifetime depen-
dent generalized-utilitarian orderings satisfy intertemporal continuity, conditional strong
Pareto and independence of the utilities of the dead is straightforward to verify. The
non-emptiness of h(R, σ0, λ0) ∩ h(R, σ, λ) for all σ0, σ ∈ Z+ and for all λ ∈ {1, . . . , L¯}
in the deﬁnition of the orderings guarantees that individual intertemporal equivalence is
satisﬁed.
Now suppose R is an anonymous ordering satisfying the axioms of Part (i) of the
theorem statement. The proof that R is birth-date and lifetime dependent generalized-
utilitarian proceeds as follows. We deﬁne an ordering
∗
R on Rn (that is, an ordering of
utility vectors) as the restriction of R that is obtained by ﬁxing birth dates and lengths
of life at speciﬁc values. We then show that
∗
R satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 2 and,
thus, must be generalized-utilitarian. Finally, we show that all comparisons according to
R can be carried out by applying
∗
R to utilities that depend on birth dates and lifetimes,
resulting in birth-date and lifetime dependent generalized utilitarianism.
Let λ0 be as in the deﬁnition of individual intertemporal equivalence. Deﬁne the
ordering
∗
R on Rn by letting, for all u, v ∈ Rn,
u
∗
Rv ⇔ (u, 01n, λ01n)R (v, 01n, λ01n) .
Clearly,
∗
R is an anonymous ordering satisfying continuity and strong Pareto. The last
remaining property of
∗
R to be established is independence of the utilities of the uncon-
cerned. Let m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, u, v ∈ Rm and u¯, v¯ ∈ Rn−m. By repeated application of
individual intertemporal equivalence, there exist uˆ, vˆ ∈ Rm such that(
(uˆ, u¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n
)
I ((u, u¯), 01n, λ01n) , (2)(
(vˆ, u¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n
)
I ((v, u¯), 01n, λ01n) , (3)(
(uˆ, v¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n
)
I ((u, v¯), 01n, λ01n) (4)
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and (
(vˆ, v¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n
)
I ((v, v¯), 01n, λ01n) . (5)
(2) and (3) together imply
((u, u¯), 01n, λ01n)R ((v, u¯), 01n, λ01n)
⇔ ((uˆ, u¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n)R ((vˆ, u¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n) . (6)
By independence of the utilities of the dead,(
(uˆ, u¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n
)
R
(
(vˆ, u¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n
)
⇔ ((uˆ, v¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n)R ((vˆ, v¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n) . (7)
(4) and (5) together imply(
(uˆ, v¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n
)
R
(
(vˆ, v¯), (L¯1m, 01n−m), λ01n
)
⇔ ((u, v¯), 01n, λ01n)R ((v, v¯), 01n, λ01n) .
(8)
Combining (6), (7) and (8), we obtain
((u, u¯), 01n, λ01n)R ((v, u¯), 01n, λ01n)⇔ ((u, v¯), 01n, λ01n)R ((v, v¯), 01n, λ01n) .
By deﬁnition of
∗
R, this is equivalent to
(u, u¯)
∗
R(v, u¯) ⇔ (u, v¯) ∗R(v, v¯)
which establishes that independence of the utilities of the unconcerned is satisﬁed.
By Theorem 2,
∗
R is generalized-utilitarian and, thus, there exists a continuous and
increasing function g:R→ R such that
u
∗
Rv ⇔
n∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥
m∑
i=1
g(vi)
for all u, v ∈ Rn. Deﬁne the function h¯: Ω →R by
h¯(d, σ, λ) = γ ⇔ (d, σ, λ)I(γ, 0, λ0)
for all (d, σ, λ) ∈ Ω and for all γ ∈ R. This function is well-deﬁned because R satisﬁes
individual intertemporal equivalence.
Consider any (u, s, ), (v, r, k) ∈ Ωn. By repeated application of individual intertem-
poral equivalence, ((
h¯(ui, si, i)
)n
i=1
, 01n, λ01n
)
I(u, s, l)
and ((
h¯(vi, ri, ki)
)n
i=1
, 01n, λ01n
)
I(v, r, k).
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Therefore,
(u, s, )R(v, r, k)⇔ ((h¯(ui, si, i))ni=1 , 01n, λ01n)R ((h¯(vi, ri, ki))ni=1 , 01n, λ01n)
⇔ (h¯(ui, si, i))ni=1 ∗R (h¯(vi, ri, ki))ni=1
⇔
n∑
i=1
g
(
h¯(ui, si, i)
) ≥ n∑
i=1
g
(
h¯(vi, ri, ki)
)
.
Letting h = g ◦ h¯ (where ◦ denotes function composition), it follows that
(u, s, )R(v, r, k)⇔
n∑
i=1
h(ui, si, i) ≥
n∑
i=1
h(vi, ri, ki).
That h satisﬁes h(R, σ0, λ0) ∩ h(R, σ, λ) = ∅ for all σ0, σ ∈ Z+ and for all λ ∈ {1, . . . , L¯}
follows from the deﬁnitions of h¯ and h. This completes the proof of Part (i).
The proofs of Parts (ii) through (iv) of the theorem are analogous. Because R is
independent of lifetimes in Part (ii) and independent of birth dates in Part (iii), the cor-
responding weakenings of individual intertemporal equivalence are suﬃcient for the char-
acterization results. In Part (iv), the equivalence axioms can be dispensed with altogether
because, by intertemporal strong Pareto, the ordering cannot depend on either birth dates
or lifetimes.
6. Geometric discounting
In many intertemporal models, geometric discounting is employed. According to geometric
discounting, the transformed lifetime utility of each person i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is multiplied by
δsi , where δ ∈ R++ is a ﬁxed discount factor. Clearly, higher values of δ are associated
with higher relative weights given to future generations. A value of δ = 1 represents
the no-discounting case and δ > 1 corresponds to ‘upcounting’—putting higher weights
on later generations than on earlier generations. The most common case occurs when
δ < 1—the later someone is born, the lower the weight attached to this person’s lifetime
utility.
The ordering R is geometric birth-date dependent generalized-utilitarian if and only
if there exist a continuous and increasing function g:R → R and δ ∈ R++ such that, for
all (u, s, ), (v, k, r) ∈ Ωn,
(u, s, )R(v, r, k)⇔
n∑
i=1
δsig(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
δrig(vi).
We do not endorse these orderings (or any other birth-date dependent orderings) be-
cause we believe that intertemporal strong Pareto is a compelling axiom and, thus, only
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lifetime-utility information should matter. However, because of the important status geo-
metric discounting enjoys in intertemporal economic models, we provide a characterization
of these orderings to illustrate their properties and the ethical judgments underlying their
use. A single axiom is required in addition to the properties employed in Part (ii) of
Theorem 3. Stationarity requires that the ranking of any two elements of Ωn is unchanged
if, ceteris paribus, the birth date of everyone is moved into the future by any number
of periods in both. This is one of the most commonly used restrictions on multi-period
social-evaluation orderings.
Stationarity: For all (u, s, ), (v, k, r) ∈ Ωn and for all τ ∈ Z++,
(u, s + τ1n, )R(v, r + τ1n, k) ⇔ (u, s, )R(v, r, k).
We now obtain a characterization of geometric birth-date dependent generalized util-
itarianism by adding stationarity to the axioms characterizing birth-date dependent gen-
eralized utilitarianism.
Theorem 4: An anonymous ordering R satisﬁes intertemporal continuity, birth-date
conditional strong Pareto, birth-date conditional individual intertemporal equivalence, in-
dependence of the existence of the dead and stationarity if and only if R is geometric
birth-date dependent generalized-utilitarian.
Proof. That geometric birth-date dependent generalized utilitarianism satisﬁes the ax-
ioms of the theorem statement is straightforward to verify.
Conversely, suppose R satisﬁes the required axioms. By Part (ii) of Theorem 3, R is
birth-date dependent generalized-utilitarian. Stationarity implies that, for all (u, ), (v, k) ∈
Rn × {1, . . . , L¯}n and for all σ, τ ∈ Z++,
(u, (σ + τ)1n, )R(v, (σ + τ)1n, k)⇔ (u, σ1n, )R(v, σ1n, k).
Letting f be as in the deﬁnition of birth-date dependent generalized utilitarianism, this is
equivalent to
n∑
i=1
f(ui, σ + τ) ≥
n∑
i=1
f(vi, σ + τ) ⇔
n∑
i=1
f(ui, σ) ≥
n∑
i=1
f(vi, σ).
Thus, for each τ ∈ Z+, there exists an increasing function ϕτ :R → R such that
n∑
i=1
f(ui, σ + τ) = ϕτ
(
n∑
i=1
f(ui, σ)
)
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for all u ∈ Rn and for all σ, τ ∈ Z+. For each σ ∈ Z+, deﬁne the function g¯σ: f(R, σ)→ R
by
g¯σ(γ) = z ⇔ f(z, σ) = γ
for all γ ∈ f(R, σ) and for all z ∈ R, that is, g¯σ is the inverse of f with respect to its
ﬁrst argument for the ﬁxed value σ of its second argument. Now let xi = f(ui, σ) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and f¯(z, σ + τ) = f(g¯σ(z), σ + τ) to obtain the functional equation
n∑
i=1
f¯(xi, σ + τ) = ϕτ
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)
.
This is a Pexider equation in the variables x1, . . . , xn the solution of which satisﬁes (see
Acze´l [1966, p. 142])
f¯(z, σ + τ) = a(τ)z + b(τ)
for all z ∈ R with functions a:Z+ →R and b:Z+ → R which do not depend on σ because
ϕτ does not. Substituting back into the deﬁnition of f¯ , we obtain
f(z, σ + τ) = a(τ)f(d, σ) + b(τ) (9)
for all z ∈ R and for all σ, τ ∈ Z+. Setting σ = 0, it follows that
f(z, τ) = a(τ)f(z, 0) + b(τ) (10)
for all z ∈ R and for all τ ∈ Z+. Therefore,
f(z, σ + τ) = a(σ + τ)f(z, 0) + b(σ + τ) (11)
for all z ∈ R and for all σ, τ ∈ Z+. Substituting (10) into (9), we obtain
f(z, σ + τ) = a(τ)[a(σ)f(z, 0) + b(σ)] + b(τ) (12)
for all z ∈ R and for all σ, τ ∈ Z+. Combining (11) and (12), it follows that
a(σ + τ)f(z, 0) + b(σ + τ) = a(τ)[a(σ)f(z, 0) + b(σ)] + b(τ)
or, equivalently,
[a(σ + τ)− a(τ)a(σ)]f(z, 0) = a(τ)b(σ) + b(τ)− b(σ + τ).
Because f is increasing in its ﬁrst argument and the right side of this equation is indepen-
dent of z, it must be the case that both sides are identically zero which requires
a(σ + τ) = a(τ)a(σ) (13)
and
a(τ)b(σ) + b(τ) = b(σ + τ) (14)
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for all σ, τ ∈ Z+. Setting σ = 1 and τ = 0 in (13), it follows that a(0) = 1. Thus, deﬁning
δ = a(1), repeated application of (13) implies
a(σ) = δσ (15)
for all σ ∈ Z+. Using (15), (14) implies
b(σ + τ) = δτ b(σ) + b(τ)
for all σ, τ ∈ Z+. Interchanging the roles of σ and τ in this equation, it follows that
b(σ + τ) = δσb(τ) + b(σ)
and, therefore, we must have
δτ b(σ) + b(τ) = δσb(τ) + b(σ)
for all σ, τ ∈ Z+. Setting τ = 1, this implies
b(σ) =
b(1)
1− δ (1− δ
σ)
for all σ ∈ Z+. By (10),
f(z, σ) = a(σ)f(z, 0) + b(σ) = δσf(z, 0) +
b(1)
1− δ (1− δ
σ) = δσ
(
f(z, 0)− b(1)
1− δ
)
+
b(1)
1− δ
for all z ∈ R and for all σ ∈ Z+. Deﬁning
g(z) = f(z, 0)− b(1)
1− δ
for all z ∈ R, it follows that
f(z, σ) = δσg(z) +
b(1)
1− δ
for all z ∈ R and for all σ ∈ Z+. Substituting into (1), we obtain
(u, s, )R(v, r, k)⇔
n∑
i=1
[
δsig(ui) +
b(1)
1− δ
]
≥
n∑
i=1
[
δrig(vi) +
b(1)
1− δ
]
⇔
n∑
i=1
δsig(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
δrig(vi)
for all (u, s, ), (v, k, r) ∈ Ωn. By birth-date conditional strong Pareto, δ must be positive.
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7. Concluding remarks
A possible objection to the way we model non-welfare information (in particular, informa-
tion on birth dates) is the claim that an individual’s birth date is ﬁxed and, thus, that our
domain which allows us to assign any birth date to an individual is too large. While it is
true that a person cannot be born at a completely arbitrary time, his or her birth date
may vary over several months because the duration of pregnancy is not ﬁxed. Given the
axioms employed in this paper, this possibility is suﬃcient for our results.
There is another possible criticism, namely, that any change in birth date—even if
it is only a matter of a single period—does not allow us to treat the individual born
in a period as the same individual as a person born in a later period instead. This
position articulates the view that a person’s birth date is a characteristic of that person
and cannot be changed without changing the person. In a variable-population setting,
there is an alternative to the approach that we have chosen that can accommodate this
criticism. If each individual is assumed to have a ﬁxed birth date, our axioms intertemporal
strong Pareto and anonymity can be replaced with a single axiom that extends the Pareto
condition so that it applies anonymously to alternatives with the same population size.
If two alternatives have the same population size and the list of utilities in the ﬁrst is a
permutation of the list of utilities in the second, anonymous intertemporal strong Pareto
implies that the two alternatives are ranked as equally good. This move is analogous
to Suppes’s [1966] grading principle. Similar combined axioms correspond to the other
Pareto axioms. We think that the combined axioms have strong ethical appeal and, as a
consequence, can serve as a convincing defense against the objection.
An argument that is sometimes made in favor of discounting is that, if there is an
inﬁnite number of periods and no discounting is employed, the resulting social-evaluation
criterion may not be well-deﬁned because it may not yield a ﬁnite value for some alterna-
tives. Because the lifetime of the universe is known to be ﬁnite, this argument is based
on a factual impossibility. But there is another argument that might appear to be more
attractive. Very large sacriﬁces by those presently alive may be justiﬁed by larger gains
to people who will exist in the distant future only. If these sacriﬁces are considered too
demanding, discounting might be proposed to alleviate the negative eﬀects on the gener-
ations that live earlier. However, this argument rests on the false claim that discounting
necessarily increases the well-being of the present generation. To see that the claim is not
true, consider a three-person society and suppose two alternatives x and y are such that
person i is born in period i for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In x, utility levels are u1 = 28, u2 = 4 and
u3 = 44 and, in y, lifetime utilities are u1 = u2 = u3 = 24. If intertemporal generalized
utilitarianism with the identity mapping as the transformation is used to evaluate the
alternatives, x is better than y and the utility level of person 1, who represents the present
generation, is 28. Alternatively suppose that geometric birth-date dependent generalized
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utilitarianism with the identity mapping and a discount factor of δ = 1/2 is used instead.
In that case, the sums of discounted utilities are 28+2+11 = 41 for x and 24+12+6 = 42
for y, so y is better and person 1’s utility is 24. As a result of discounting, the present
generation is worse oﬀ.
Our view is that, for the purpose of social evaluation, the well-being of future gen-
erations should not be discounted. If maximization of the ethically appropriate objective
function requires the present generation to sacriﬁce most of its consumption for the beneﬁt
of others, then such an action can be considered supererogatory: desirable but beyond the
call of duty. If these sacriﬁces are considered to be too demanding, we do not think it
is a suitable response to give future generations a smaller weight in the social ordering.
Instead, a suﬃciently high level of well-being for the present generation can be guaran-
teed by imposing a ﬂoor on their utility as an additional constraint in the choice problem.
This is a more natural and ethically attractive way of dealing with problems arising from
supererogation than replacing an ethically appropriate social ordering with one that fails
to treat generations impartially. See also Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000] for a
details. Cowen [1992] and Cowen and Parﬁt [1992] present a Paretian argument against
discounting, and further discussions can be found in Broome [1992, pp. 92–108, 2004, pp.
126–128].
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